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Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400220001-2

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SUMMARY

GENERAL

- 1. Comment on Soviet note to Norway charging treaty violations (page 3).
- 2. French Foreign Office official suggests Big Three act together on Moscow economic conference (page 3).

FAR EAST

3. Chinese Nationalists will accept US recommendations on budget (page 4).

SOUTH ASIA

4. Comment on the assassination of the Pakistani Prime Minister (page 4).

NEAR EAST

5. Initial Syrian and Jordanian reaction to Middle East Command (page 5).

EASTERN EUROPE

6. Yugoslav Chief of Staff concerned over West's strategic plans (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE

7. French refuse Italians' plea for help in gaining UN membership (page 7).

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Approved For F	elease 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0004002	20001-2
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GENERAL

1. Comment on Soviet note to Norway charging treaty violations:

The Soviet note to Norway protesting the establishment of bases for use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is in line with previous Russian protests on the occasion of Norway's adherence to NATO in 1949. Threatening in tone, the note resembles other protests to Western nations regarding NATO or German rearmament.

Although the note does not refer specifically to current US negotiations with Norway for operating rights at Norwegian air and naval installations, its timing suggests Soviet awareness of such negotiations. Charges of Norwegian violation of assurances to the USSR may somewhat prolong these negotiations or delay subsequent ratification by Norway's Parliament. The Norwegian Government has consistently refused, however, to be deterred by Soviet maneuvers.

2.	French	Foreign	Office	official	suggests	Big	Three	act	together	on	Moscow
		ic confer									······································

A French Foreign Office official, discussing the Soviet-inspired economic conference now scheduled to be held in Moscow during December, expressed his informal opinion that the US, the UK and France should either agree publicly to call this a Soviet political maneuver and discourage acceptance, or else encourage the attendance of "courageous individuals who will speak out." An international initiating committee is currently in session, or about to meet, in Zurich to plan the agenda.

The French Government has so far 'discreetly discouraged' those French industrialists, technicians, trade unionists, and public officials who have been invited to the conference.

growing reliance upon concerted action among the Big Three on all major

	- 3 -	
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international issues. Nonetheless, during the past year they have repeatedly shown interest in resuming East-West trade relations and have recently been placing increasing emphasis on France's need for additional imports from the Orbit. Bilateral French-Soviet trade discussions are now in progress, and the French are probably loath to turn down any opportunity to expand East-West trade, even though the prospective conference will not be governmental and may be exploited as a Communist propaganda forum.

FAR EAST

o.	Chinese Nationalists	will accep	t US recommendations on	budget:

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The Economic Stabilization Board, on which US officials are represented as observers, will review the Chinese Nationalist budget prior to approval, according to a proposal made by the Nationalists to the US Embassy in Taipei. The Economic Stabilization Board will make recommendations on both military and civilian sections of the budget.

As a further opportunity for the US to review the budget, the Nationalists propose that its military sections be prepared in consultation with the Military Assistance Advisory Group before it is submitted to the Board. The Nationalists also propose to submit regular statements of current expenditures and receipts to the Board.

Comment: This is a partial surrender of sovereignty which the Chinese Nationalists have found hard to accept, but the continuing financial solvency of the Nationalist Government is being assured only by US aid. To ensure the efficient use of aid funds, the US has sought effective control by American officials over Nationalist expenditures.

SOUTH ASIA

4. Comment on the assassination of the Pakistani Prime Minister:

The assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on 16 October increases the possibility of war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. By removing the ablest figure in the Pakistani Government, it raises doubts as to the future stability of the regime

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	and the national economy. Finally, it may necessitate a reexamination of Western policy in South Asia.	
	Indications are that the assassination was associated with an extremist group which opposes the Pakistani Government's go-slow policy on Kashmir and advocates direct action, including war if necessary, to break the current deadlock on that issue. If the authority of the central government is not maintained by the army in Pakistan-held Azad Kashmir, there is danger of border raids which might lead to all-out war with India.	
	The death of the Prime Minister leaves the Pakistani Government without a firm guiding hand. None of the four most likely successors is of the Prime Minister's caliber, and none is likely to keep the political opposition in check for any considerable period of time.	
	Anti-Pakistan elements inside and outside the Covernment of India may try to capitalize on Liaquat's death by increasing political and economic pressure on Pakistan. Considering the delicate balance which characterizes the Pakistani economy, internal difficulties and Indian pressure might cause it to collapse.	2
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	NEAR EAST	
5.	Initial Syrian and Jordanian reaction to Middle East Command:	
	The Prime Minister of Jordan and the Syrian Chief of Staff both expressed considerable interest in the proposed Allied Middle East Command when	
	- 5 -	
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		US diplomatic representatives in Amman and Damascus explained the details of the plan. Both officials voiced the hope that their respective countries might participate in the Middle East defense organization.
		Egypt was to be a founding member of the Middle East defense organization. The private views of these two influential Arab officials reflect the initially favorable reaction which many Arab leaders felt toward the Middle East Command proposals. It is clear, however, that the official attitude of the various Arab governments will be tempered by subsequent events in Egypt, where nationalistic demonstrations have followed Egypt's abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and summary rejection of the Western-proposed Middle East defense plan.
		EASTERN EUROPE
	6.	Yugoslav Chief of Staff concerned over West's strategic plans:
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:		Vardar gap in the south in case of a general conflict. He stated that the Yugoslav Government, for political as well as strategic reasons, must defend all parts of its national territory with equal vigor. Popovic described as unwarranted the fear that the Yugoslav army would quickly withdraw to the Bosnian mountains, exposing the Allied flanks, but, he added, neither could the Yugoslav army expose its own center by the concentration of its troops on these flanks.
		Ambassador Allen reports a statement by Tito that outstanding differences on the military aid agreement were minor and could easily be solved. Tito based his plea for military assistance on the view that if any attack on Yugoslavia were prolonged, the conflict would probably expand into a general war, whereas a quick Yugoslav repulse of the Satellites would lessen this danger.

Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400220001-2

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WESTERN EUROPE

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		at this time i	est in the Secur is probably due te which might	rity Council, to the	their refusal eir reluctanc	ench would u to assist the e to take the	! Italians
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